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The purpose of this paper is to test whether there is an intergenera-
tional transmission of gender preferences in educational resource allo-
cation among children. The unique data set of Taiwan’s Panel Study
of Family Dynamics project provides us a rich 3-generation education
information and allows us to probe into this question. We performed
our analysis along two directions: the ﬁrst is to see whether the society
as a whole has any macro change in gender-speciﬁc education achieve-
ment, and the second is to see whether there is any within-lineage
transmission of gender preferences across generations. After carefully
reviewing the education system and societal characteristics in Taiwan,
we set up an empirical model to estimate and test the hypotheses of
intergenerational transmission of gender preferences. We also perform
various statistical analyses to support our ﬁndings, e.g. contraposi-
tion of a proposition. As far as the macro pattern is concerned, we
found that although there is a clear tendency of diﬀerential treatment
against females in the old generation, this tendency is signiﬁcantly
weakened and nearly vanishes in the young generation. Furthermore,
the supporting eﬀect of senior siblings in the old generation becomes a
crowding (resource-dilution) eﬀect in the young generation. However,
within each micro lineage, there is a mild “habitus” eﬀect in gender-
speciﬁc educational resource allocation in the sense that parents who
had the experience of gender-speciﬁc diﬀerential treatment tend to
treat their children in a similar fashion. Moreover, this mild habi-
tus eﬀect is stronger for female respondents (who were the deprived
group) than for male respondents (who were the privileged group).
(JEL: N35, J16)
11 Introduction
Ever since the seminal work of Becker (1964), social scientists have long
noticed the importance of education in individual earnings and career devel-
opment. Since the quantity and quality of children’s education are very much
inﬂuenced by the attitude and devotion of their parents, much of the research
on this topic has focused on various family-related aspects of children’s edu-
cation. The purpose of this paper is to use a unique data set to probe into, to
the best of our knowledge, a new dimension of the research: how the pattern
of educational resource allocation among children has changed across genera-
tions. Our study contains macro as well as micro aspects of the problem. As
to the macro aspect, we are interested in knowing if a particular pattern of
within-family disadvantaged treatment (e.g., against girls) has weakened or
disappeared in the young generation. As to the micro aspect, we investigate
whether a parent’s diﬀerential treatment toward his or her children has any
lasting impact when the children later on form their own families and have
their own children. We begin with a brief review of the related literature.
For the purpose of comparison, we classify, perhaps idiosyncratically, the
related literature into three strands. The ﬁrst strand compares the pos-
sibly diﬀerent achievements, either in attained education or in earnings,
among children of diﬀerent sexes or birth orders. Related literature in-
cludes Sewell and Hauser (1977), Greenhalgh (1985), Behrman and Taubman
(1986), Kessler (1991), Birdsall (1991), Parish and Willis (1993), Butcher and
Case (1994), Hauser and Kuo (1998), and Ermisch and Francesconi (2001).
The general ﬁnding is that, due to family budget constraints and/or diﬀer-
ential preferences, girls or children in the middle birth order tend to receive
less educational resources from their parents.
The second strand of literature is concerned with the comparative study
of siblings or twins. The work here seems to put more emphasis on using
1such sibling or twin data to control the family background and to identify
the inﬂuence of other variables on individual achievement, rather than to
compare siblings’ achievement diﬀerences per se. Important contributions
and surveys along this line can be found, just to name a few, in Sewell and
Hauser (1977), Griliches (1979), Behrman et al. (1994), and Card (1999).
The third strand of literature concerns the intergenerational mobility of
earnings or education. The focus along this line is often on the role of ed-
ucation and family background on a person’s mobility parameters. Related
studies with respect to diﬀerent societal scenarios can be found in Bowles
(1972), Behrman and Taubman (1985), Lillard and Willis (1994), Dearden
et al. (1997), and Solon (1999).
The focus of this paper is related to the intergenerational transmission of
sex-based preferential treatment, but it is from a new angle that is diﬀerent
from all of the previous studies. Our main question can be addressed as
follows. Suppose we have a set of sibling data of generation t, and are able to
identify the eﬀect of birth order, sibling size, and in particular child gender
on siblings’ education achievement. Suppose further that children of partic-
ular characteristics in some families were preferentially or poorly treated in
education investment in generation t. When children of generation-t grew
up and had their own children, i.e. generation-(t+1), we would like to know
how the pattern of unequal resource allocation has changed in terms of the
allocation of educational resources among children of generation-(t + 1).
Intuitively, there are two diﬀerent factors that may change the pattern of
resource allocation among children of generation-(t + 1). On the one hand,
because diﬀerential treatment among children are usually due to resource
constraints or traditional conceptions of parents, the pattern of diﬀerential
treatment should be lessened when such constraints or conceptions have re-
laxed along with economic development. On the other hand, as predicted by
psychological theories, a child being diﬀerentially treated in childhood may
2form a stereotype idea about gender roles, and continue this attitude toward
his or her own children.1 Our goal then is to study whether the sex-based
preferential treatment in education of an earlier generation may transmit,
either in macro or micro aspect, to the next generation.
In order to study empirically the problem posed above, a comprehensive
data set is necessary. In particular, we need at least two generations of sibling
data in order to identify the possible sex-based diﬀerential treatment within
each generation; and only with such a good data set are we able to test
whether the experience by siblings of generation t may carry over to those
of generation t+1. Furthermore, if we are to control the parental education
background of generation t  1 so as to improve the estimation eﬃciency of
the behavioral relationship in generation t, the data requirement is even more
restrictive: we need the education data of three generations to accomplish
the estimation and test. Lack of comprehensive data sets described above is
perhaps a major reason why there has been no study focusing on such an
interesting problem in the literature. Fortunately, a recent survey conducted
in Taiwan provides us with such a data set and, hence, allows us to perform
this study. Details of the data set is given in Section 2.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2, we
present the panel study of family dynamics (PSFD) data and outline the
background characteristics of the education system in Taiwan. The econo-
metric model together with the empirical analysis are presented in Sections
3 and 4, respectively. The ﬁnal section concludes.
1Concerning the correspondence conceptions between parents and children, see for in-
stance the discussion in Goodnow (1992).
32 The Data Set and the Social Background
The data set we use is from the PSFD survey recently conducted in Tai-
wan.2 Since Taiwan is a well-known area undergoing rapid economic and
demographic transitions,3 parents’ attitude toward gender diﬀerences is ex-
pected to change signiﬁcantly in the past four decades. Against this changing
background, it is more likely to observe coexisting samples with contrast-
ing socioeconomic characteristics, which are particularly appropriate for the
study of intergenerational changes in family behavior. Furthermore, since
the education system on Taiwan is governed by the Ministry of Education
and is uniform across the country, the educational cost does not depend on
geographical factors or gender of students. This again makes Taiwan’s data
suitable for our study.
The PSFD survey began in 1999. It starts with roughly 3,000 respondents
of a random survey from cohorts born between 1934 and 1964, inclusive. The
interviewed questions cover detailed socio-economic information about family
members of the sampled individual as well as their relations with each other.
In particular, for each randomly sampled respondent, information concerning
the educational background of almost all of his or her siblings was asked.4
2The data used is the third-year output of an attempt to develop a unique panel data set
in a Chinese society. The project, entitled PSFD, was conducted with the support of the
Chinh Ching-Kou Foundation and the National Science Council of Taiwan, and under the
auspices of Gary Becker, Angus Deaton, Robert Hauser, James Heckman, Cheng Hsiao,
Ronald Lee, William Parish, George Tiao, Jim Vaupel, Arthur Wolf, Cyrus Chu, and other
local collaborators. The data set is free of charge for all academic uses. For details, see
http://psfd.sinica.edu.tw.
3See Chu and Lee (2000) for more details.
4Up to 6 siblings’ education information was asked. This is about to exhaust all pos-
sibilities. In our two-generation sample points, 18.4% of them have sibling sizes larger
than or equal to 7, in which most (17.8%) belong to the old generation. When the sibling
size is larger than 7, the education information is restricted to the eldest 6. For the old
generation, most parents have 4, 5, or 6 children, totaling 49.6% of the old population.
4Moreover, related information of the main respondent’s parents, such as their
ethnicity and school years, was also included in the interview. As such, we
have enough information to estimate the diﬀerential education achievement
of siblings for the interviewee’s generation, call them generation o (old).
To enlarge the information of the family, PSFD also interviewed one (ran-
domly chosen) sibling of the main respondent in year 2000, using the same
questionnaire as the main respondent’s. For all interviewed individuals, the
education information of their children is also asked. This allows us to study
the diﬀerential education achievement of the generation of interviewees’ chil-
dren, referred to as generation y (young). The sampling structure is drawn
in Figure 1.5
Since part of our purposes is to analyze the causes of diﬀerential educa-
tion achievement among siblings, we feel obliged to introduce the education
system in Taiwan. First, Taiwan has a national education system governed
by the Ministry of Education. Since the tuitions and fees of schools are set
by the Ministry, there are no geographical factors in the educational costs.
Second, the admission to various schools are mainly based on written exams
so that gender of students plays no role in educational opportunities. Details
For the young generation, most parents have 3 or 4 children, totaling 54.7% of the young
population. In summary, the sibling size of our samples does allow us to analyze the
problem of resource allocation across siblings.
5To double check whether the interviewed information of sibling education is ﬂawless,
we make the following eﬀort. First we write down two vectors, one contains the years
of education of the main respondent’s (denoted by A) siblings, and the other contains
those of the siblings of the randomly-selected respondent B, who is a sibling of A and is
also interviewed. Then we compare the diﬀerence of these two vectors: if the sum of the
absolute diﬀerences of these two vectors is larger than some critical number, say 4, then
we ﬁgure that the memory of the two interviewed siblings is not consistent, and delete
this observation. It turns out that 75% of our sample has an average diﬀerence less than
1 year for each child, indicating that our data set has some reasonable quality. Details are
available from the authors on request.
5are given below.
2.1 The Education system on Taiwan
There are ﬁve main tiers of regular schools in Taiwan, namely elementary
(6 years), junior high (3 years), high school (3 years), college (4 years) and
graduate schools, together with some supplementary vocational schools. Al-
though various schools used to screen their own students, starting from 1950
most schools in Taiwan have participated in the joint entrance examinations
(JEE) to admit students. Before 1968, for the entrance from elementary
to junior high, from junior high to high school, or from high school to col-
lege, a student must go through a respective JEE. The high school to college
JEE is nationwide, whereas the others are held in separate districts, within
which there are thousands of students joining the competition. After 1968,
the mandatory education extends from six to nine years, and hence the JEE
from elementary to junior high was abolished. As one can see, nearly all the
sampled respondents are subject to the JEE system.
In Taiwan, because (i) the training of teachers of all tiers of schools ex-
cept the colleges were monopolized by national Normal colleges, (ii) the salary
scales of teachers and professors are seniority-based, and (iii) the University
professor licensure is uniformly regulated by the Ministry of Education in
most relevant periods of our study,6 there are no a priori reasons to expect
quality diﬀerences among school teachers. Moreover, the tuition upper bound
of private schools regulated by the government also renders the quality im-
provement of private schools impossible. Thus, most parents and students
prefer to go to the less-expensive public schools and universities rather than
6The monopoly of training teachers was ﬁnally changed in 1997, and the uniform pro-
fessor licensure system was decentralized in 1991; but these recent changes could not have
aﬀected the previous decisions of the respondents. For related discussion of controlling
school quality, see Behrman and Birdsall (1983).
6the private ones. A JEE ranks all participating students according to their
test scores, and higher-score students are allowed to choose schools to enter
before lower-score students do. Eventually, there are always some disap-
pointed students who do not have any desirable match.7
The JEE in Taiwan is basically a written exam, and therefore the criterion
of screening students is very uniform. Given the above-mentioned rigid JEE
system, whether a student can enter a higher tier school or college depends
on his or her ability as well as the resources devoted by his or her parents
(e.g., to after school tutoring). The resource devotion from parents to their
children of course depends on the parents’ education background, ethnicity,
budget constraint, and in particular their gender perception. For instance,
if the parents have ﬁnance constraints and are only able to aﬀord one child
to go to college, then their preferences with respect to child gender or birth
order may be important. In sum, the uniform JEE system in Taiwan makes a
student’s upward moving ladders relatively standard, and hence is convenient
for our econometric analysis.
2.2 Descriptive statistics of the data
Some descriptive statistics of the sample are presented in Table 1. As one can
see from the table, although most statistics are roughly of the same size for
males and females, there are several interesting exceptions. First, the average
year of schooling for men is longer than that of women, revealing a possible
7For instance, in year 2000, 125,498 students registered the JEE of college entrance.
The overall entrance rate from high school to college was 59.98%. The most-preferred
college in general is the National Taiwan University, which only admitted 3,244 students
in year 2000. Students whose scores lower than the rank criterion of various departments
of National Taiwan University would have to choose other universities to study. In the
same year, there were 22,115 students participating the JEE from junior high to high
schools in the Taipei area; corresponding ﬁgures in other areas are omitted.
7pattern of sex-related diﬀerential treatment. This is particularly so for the
old generation where the diﬀerence is about 2 years. The diﬀerence shrinks
markedly to 0.3 year in the young generation. The same phenomenon is also
shown in the diﬀerence of education years between the father and mother of
the respondent. Second, the average of schooling years increases substantially
across generations for both men and women. It is then not clear whether the
reduction in diﬀerence between the gender-speciﬁc schooling years is due to
the improved economic resources of the parents or a change in their attitude.
We also notice from Table 1 that the sibling size reduces signiﬁcantly
across generations, revealing the pattern of Taiwan’s demographic transition.
Finally, it is very interesting to observe that, although the probabilities of
being the ﬁrst-born are roughly the same for male and female children, the
probabilities of being the last-born are substantially larger for males. Indeed,
if there is a general preference for sons that induces many parents to have
“at least one son,” their optimal stopping rule of fertility would indeed wind
up with a large macro proportion of boys being the last-born.
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
3 Changing Pattern of Sex Preferences:
A Macro Analysis
There are several approaches to estimating and testing the intergenerational
transmission of sex preferences. We start with a macro analysis that shows
the diﬀerence in education between male and female children even after ad-
justing for eﬀects of various explanatory variables and allowing for a change
in mandatory education in Taiwan. The section also examines in detail the
eﬀects of various variables on education in Taiwan across generations and
gender.
83.1 Diﬀerence in education between gender
Let the subscript tij refer to the jth child of family (actually lineage) i in
generation t, and let Y be the schooling years of the child,  the family ﬁxed
or random eﬀect parameter, S the sex indicator of the child in question,
Zti a vector of lineage-speciﬁc variables, X a vector of other explanatory
variables, and  the error term satisfying all regular assumptions, especially
being independent of S. The ﬁrst econometric model we employ is
Ytij = ti + 0Stij + 1(It  Stij) + tXtij + Zti + tij; t = y;o (1)
where It is a generational dummy variable with It = 1 if t = y and It = 0
if t = o. In Equation (1), we use various interaction terms to allow possibly
diﬀerent inﬂuences of variables across generations. In particular, 0 captures
the possible existence of parents’ gender preferences, and 1 characterizes
the weakening or strengthening of this gender eﬀect for the young generation
relative to the old generation.
Following the common practice in the literature, the explanatory variable
X should include the (sex- and seniority-speciﬁc) sibling size, the ethnicity
background, the education levels of the parents, and other relevant variables.
The exogenous variables adopted in our regression are by and large compat-
ible with those in Parish and Willis (1993), Lillard and Willis (1994), and
Ermisch and Francesconi (2001).
Our sample consists of nearly 3,000 interviewees born between 1934 and
1964. For these interviewees, most of them and their siblings have ﬁnished
their education by the time of the interview. However, since our goal is to
estimate the family resource allocation across generations, we can employ
only interviewees who are old enough so that some of their children have
completed the education. Thus, interviewees who do not have children older
than 22 years old are deleted. This reduces the eﬀective sample families to
roughly 1,500. In addition, several observations contain missing information
9such as father’s birth year. Deleting these points, we have 1,364 families of
data used in the estimation of Equation (1); see Table 2 below.
In Equation (1), because of the existence of a common family eﬀect, the
errors tij are not independent for data from the same lineage. Any least
squares estimation failing to take into account this dependence will result in
ineﬃciency. Furthermore, as pointed out by Griliches (1979), applying the
ﬁxed eﬀect model to the family context may exacerbate other econometric
problems such as measurement errors and may interfere with the estimation
of common-to-all-sibling variables. Care must be exercised. To overcome
these potential problems in estimation, we follow Parish and Willis (1993)
and adopt a consistent approach to estimate the standard errors of the least
square estimates, see Huber (1967), White (1980), and Newey and West
(1987).
Our goal is to test whether there is any generational change in discrimina-
tion against a female child, i.e. to test the hypothesis 1 = 0 in Equation (1).
To this end, we ﬁrst use all the data to show a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in edu-
cation between male and female children in the presence of the explanatory
variables used and a change in mandatory education in Taiwan; see models
1 and 2 in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
Consider the pooled estimates with consistent covariance matrix estima-
tion in Table 2. The numbers of younger or older siblings refer to the child in
question, but the birth cohort dummies refer to that of the child’s father. The
reference group for the father’s birth cohort is “father born before 1920.”8
8For the old generation, there are 2,496 observations with their fathers born before
1920, 1,088 observations with their fathers born in 1920-1929, and 178 observations with
their fathers born after 1929. For the young generation, there are 57 observations with
their fathers born before 1929, 732 observations with their fathers born between 1930-1939,
and 1,870 observations with their fathers bron after 1940.
10The regression result in Column 3, marked by model 2, includes the same
variables as those of model 1 (Column 2) and the dummy variable “born after
1956”, which signiﬁes the structural change of mandatory education from 6
to 9 years as mentioned in Section 2. Comparing models 1 and 2, we see that
allowing for the structural change does not alter signiﬁcantly the impacts of
other variables on schooling years of a child. The fourth column (model 3) of
Table 2 adds the interaction terms between certain explanatory variables and
the generation dummy in order to capture the coeﬃcient change associated
with the young generation.9
¿From Table 2, we observe that the gender coeﬃcient is always negatively
signiﬁcant, indicating a clear pattern of unfavorable education achievement
against the female. Thus, the data support the general belief that female
children received fewer years of education in a Chinese society on Taiwan.
However, from model 3 (Column 4) of the table, this gender diﬀerence is most
pronounced in the old generation and it is signiﬁcantly lessened in the young
generation. Indeed, as one can see from the coeﬃcient of the product term
of generation and gender, the net eﬀect is even slightly positive (1.99-1.97 =
0.02), albeit statistically insigniﬁcant, for the young-generation females.
As to the eﬀect of sibling sizes of diﬀerent sexes and orders, we ﬁnd that
older brothers or sisters always have a positive eﬀect on the child’s education.
This positive eﬀect is particularly signiﬁcant for older sisters, a result consis-
tent with the ﬁnding in Greenhalgh (1985). However, such a positive eﬀect
decreases substantially in the young generation, as one can see from the neg-
atively signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the product term of generation dummy with
9The father’s cohort captures the social as well economic background of an observation.
We have tried to replace this cohort dummy by the per capita GDP by the time when the
child in question ﬁnishes his or her elementary school. But this is not possible because
1) Taiwan’s GDP accounting starts only since 1952 and 2) some old-generation children
ﬁnished their elementary school in Mainland China, and hence their corresponding per
capita GDPs cannot be compared with that of Taiwan.
11older sisters in model 3. This phenomenon is consistent with the general pat-
tern of economic development: In Taiwan’s early development period with
general pro-boy perceptions, parents tended to ask female older children to
join the labor market early so that their incomes could support the education
of younger children, especially younger boys. As the family income increases
along with economic development, parental budget constraints relax, and
hence the original dependence of younger children’s education on older sib-
lings’ incomes is reduced. Of course, parents’ attitude toward the gender of
their children may be more equal for the young generation, which may also
help explain the phenomenon. In summary, the macro pattern shows that
there is little disadvantage for female children of the young generation, but
we shall investigate in more details the micro changes behind such a macro
pattern.
On the other hand, the number of younger sisters or brothers always
have a negative eﬀect on the education of the child, revealing the crowding
(i.e., resource dilution) eﬀect of younger siblings. This is consistent with the
evidence found in most previous literature, e.g. Parish and Willis (1993).
Although the coeﬃcients of the product term of younger sibling size and
the generation dummy also have reverse signs (indicating a weakening of the
crowding eﬀect), they are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Parents’ education shows a positive eﬀect on those of their children, a
result consistent with the general perception. This positive correlation is
weakened in the young generation, perhaps due to the trend of public and
mandatory education, which weakens the importance of parental background.
Fathers having professional occupations are generally richer and tend to pro-
vide better educational opportunity and support for their children; this is re-
vealed in the positive coeﬃcient of the father’s occupation variable.10 Again,
10The occupation variable used here is similar to that in Erikson and Goldthorp (1992),
where the author classify the occupation into 11 categories according to its skill level,
12the impact of father’s occupation on children’s education is signiﬁcantly re-
duced in the young generation. Finally, the reference group of ethnicity is
Taiwan’s aborigines; the positively signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for all three new mi-
grant groups listed show that the aborigines indeed have inferior educational
achievement. The relative diﬀerence in educational achievement among new
migrants will be further discussed later.
Finally, as a sensitivity study, we re-ﬁt the models in Table 2 using data
from families that have at most ﬁve children. This reduces the number of
observations from 7655 to 4689. Estimates of the key variables “Gender” and
“Generation*Gender” have the same sign as before and remain statistically
signiﬁcant. Since families in the old generation tend to have more children,
our subsample removes more data from the old generation than from the
young one. The signiﬁcant results show clearly that the unfavorable treat-
ment of female children in the old generation is indeed pronounced.
3.2 Changing pattern across generation and gender
To gain insight into the changing pattern in educational achievement be-
tween diﬀerent generations and genders, we rerun the basic regression mod-
els in Equation (1) separately for the old and young generations, and for
children of diﬀerent sexes. The reference group of father’s birth cohort is
“father born before 1920” for the old generation, and “father born between
1920-1929” for the young generation. Since there are only 57 observations
with their fathers born in the 1920-1929 cohort, it is not surprising that the
corresponding coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant. As we can see from Table 3, for
the young generation, the negative (crowding) eﬀect of younger siblings re-
mains the same, whereas the originally positive eﬀect of older siblings (on
from higher-grade professionals to unskilled mannual and algricultural workers. Readers
can ﬁnd more detailed explanation from their work.
13younger ones’ education) disappears or reverses, a result consistent with the
ﬁnding in Table 2. For instance, the impact of older brothers and sisters on
a (younger) child’s education changes from positive to negative or insigniﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero. This suggests that the original supporting eﬀect
of older sibling has become a crowding eﬀect to junior children in the young
generation. Notice that whenever we ﬁnd signiﬁcant crowding sibling eﬀects
in Table 3, a junior female child always receives a larger impact (in absolute
value) than a junior male child. This remains true for the young generation,
indicating that gender-speciﬁc preferential treatment may still exist in the
young generation. We shall return to this point in Section 4. Table 3 also
conﬁrms that the importance of parental education and occupation has re-
duced in the young generation, again indicating the increasing importance
of public education and the declining role of family background.
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
Among the three groups of new migrants, it is observed from Table 3
that, for the old generation, educational achievement for mainlanders (the
most recent migrants) are signiﬁcantly larger than that of Fukien and Hakka
(the earlier migrants).11 But for the young generation, the diﬀerence is ei-
ther blurred or reversed, indicating that the superiority of mainlanders in
educational achievement disappears in the young generation. This is indeed
intuitively appealing. For recent migrants who mostly ﬂed the chaotic envi-
ronment of Mainland China during the Chinese civil wars in the 1940s, they
certainly realized that “carryable capital goods” are not physical assets, but
human resources. Thus, they tended to invest more on their children’s educa-
tion. As time passes and as the young generation gradually loses the memory
of the chaotic past, they tend to behave like old migrants and decrease their
11This is the conditional result. Unconditionally, the average years of education for
Aborigine, Fukien, Hakka and Mainlander are respectively 10.40, 12.06, 12.98 and 13.02,
of which the pattern is consistent with the result in Table 3.
14educational investment on children.
4 The Changing Pattern of Sex Preferences:
A Micro Analysis
In Table 2, the coeﬃcient of generationgender being positively signiﬁcant
only says that parents’ gender discriminations against girls are weaker for
the young generation. Further analysis from Table 3 tells us that, as far as
the crowding eﬀect is concerned, female children of both generations seem to
be aﬀected more acutely. The goal of this section is to investigate possible
reasons behind the observed phenomenon. We consider four most likely ex-
planations for the changes. They are (a) the improved conception of gender
equality, (b) the slackness of budget constraints in modern economic envi-
ronment, (c) a change in gender cost, and (d) a change in gender wages. Our
analysis shows that the reasons (b), (c) and (d) cannot explain fully the ob-
served improvement in education of female children in the young generation.
The mature conception of gender equality thus plays a role in the change.
We take a two-step procedure to prove the validity of our conjecture that
the mature conception of gender quality plays a role in the change. First, we
employ an econometric model to show the existence and direction of inter-
generational carry-over eﬀect concerning discrimination against girls in the
data. Second, we divide the data of the young generation into two subsam-
ples based on parents’ gender. The diﬀerence between the results obtained
from the subgroups lends support to our conjecture via contraposition be-
cause the data division based on parents’ gender should have no impacts on
the carry-over eﬀect if the eﬀect is indeed caused by reason (b), (c) or (d).
154.1 Existence of carry-over eﬀect
Suppose a member in generation o has experienced unfair treatment against
girls in educational opportunity. We would like to know how would this
experience aﬀect the educational resource allocation toward his or her own
children in generation y. In this subsection, we propose two ways to charac-
terize and test the existence and direction of such a micro intergenerational
carry-over eﬀect.
Consider a modiﬁed version of Equation (1) as follows:
Ysij = si + siSsij + sXsij + Zsi + sij; s = y;o; (2)
where si is the sex-bias parameter of family i in generation s. The major
diﬀerence between Equations (1) and (2) is that the gender eﬀect is allowed
to vary across families (actually lineages) indexed by various subscript i’s in
(2). The hypotheses of interest are then as follows.
1. Compensation hypothesis. It suggests that parents who have expe-
rienced unfavorable treatment to girls when they were young tend to
treat their own daughters better.
2. Habitus hypothesis. It implies that parents who have experienced
unfavorable treatment to girls when they were young tend to treat
their own children in a similar fashion.
3. Reenforcing hypothesis. It suggests that parents’ habitus preferences
against females are strengthened in the young generation.
Although Equation (2) for the old generation is easy to understand con-
ceptually, it involves estimation of 971 sex-bias parameters ˆ oi (the lineage
size 971 is explained in footnote 13 below). This requires signiﬁcant com-
puter work and is formidable until recently. The newest version of STATA
published in the ﬁrst quarter of 2002 allows us to estimate regression with
16up to 11,000 parameters. A simpliﬁed but less eﬃcient approach for those
who do not have the sophisticated software is given in the Appendix.
One way to test the possible existence of a lagged eﬀect of sex-based
unfair resource allocation is the following. We run Equation (2) separately
for generations y and o respectively, and obtain a set of paired gender eﬀect
parameters f(ˆ oi; ˆ yi)g for all the families with suﬃcient data points. If the
sex-based unfair allocation of resources has a habitus (compensation) eﬀect
from generation o to generation y, then we should observe a positively (neg-
atively) signiﬁcant correlation between these two estimates. A simple test
using correlation coeﬃcients can then be exercised to see if the lagged eﬀect
exists. While this approach is intuitively appealing, it treats the estimates
f(ˆ oi; ˆ yi)g as data in testing the correlation coeﬃcient. In other words, this
approach uses a two-step procedure to make inference and appears to be
indirect. We shall use the following alternatives.
The second way to test the possible existence of a carry-over eﬀect of
sex-based unfair allocation is to run Equation (2) ﬁrst for the old generation
to obtain an estimate ˆ oi, and then run the following equation for generation
y:
Yyij = yi + (ˆ oi  Syij) + yXyij + Zyi + yij: (3)
We then test the signiﬁcance of  according with the various hypotheses
listed above. Speciﬁcally, when  < 0 (0 <   1,  > 1), it suggests that
the compensation (habitus, reenforcing) hypothesis applies. Evidently, this
second approach uses the lineage-speciﬁc information of sex preferences in an
earlier generation to infer the possible inﬂuence on individuals of the latter
generation in the same lineage.
The estimation results of Equations (2) and (3) are presented in Table 4.
As one can see from the Table, coeﬃcients of most variables are the same as
those in Table 3: i) the size of senior siblings has a supporting eﬀect for the
juniors’ education in generation o, but has a crowding eﬀect (i.e. resource
17dilution) in generation y; ii) the size of junior siblings has a crowding eﬀect
in both generation o and generation y; iii) the inﬂuence of parents’ education
and occupation on child education reduces, either in scale or in signiﬁcance,
in the y generation; iv) the inﬂuence of ethnicity background (among new
migrants) on child education decreases in the y generation, but the diﬀerence
between new migrants and aborigines still exists.12
[Insert Table 4 about here.]
The main focus of Table 4 is the coeﬃcient of [previous generation’s fam-
ily speciﬁc gender eﬀects * gender] (i.e. ) in Equation (3). The result
shows that the habitus hypothesis cannot be rejected at the (one-tail) 5%
level. Speciﬁcally, the estimate 0.0357 is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at
the one-side 5% level and it is obvious less than unity. This result can be
compared with what is found in Table 2 to gain insight into the intergenera-
tion eﬀect. Combining the coeﬃcients of [gender] and [generation * gender]
in Table 2, we see that there is essentially no macro gender eﬀect for the
young generation. Table 4, on the other hand, shows that the sex-based
discrimination persists within many lineages into the young generation, even
though the average habitus coeﬃcient is fairly small in magnitude with only
3.57% of the estimated diﬀerence in the educational achievement of the old
generation.
A possible improvement to Table 4 is to ﬁt Equation (3) only using data
from families in which there were signiﬁcant gender discrimination in the old
generation; i.e., when their corresponding ˆ oi’s are signiﬁcant. To do this, we
12As one can see, there are 1,364 families in the estimation of Equation (2). But to
estimate the regressions in Table 4, we have to delete lineages which have a missing value
in any generation. This additional restriction limits the number of sampled families to
971. To obtain columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, we only keep lineages which have children of
both sexes in order to do the gender discrimination analysis. The lineage size then becomes
750. Notice that equations (2) and (3) involve panel data, hence the actual individuals
observations used in the regression are much larger than the size of families.
18modify Equation (3) as
Yyij = yi + (ˆ 







ˆ oi; if ˆ oi is signiﬁcant
0; otherwise.
Equation (4) assumes that the intergenerational carry-over eﬀect exists only
in families where the old generation did have a gender discrimination. Results
(listed in the second column of Table 5) show that this improvement only
has some minor impacts.
4.2 Elimination of possible explanations
The reduced-form model in Equation (3) alone cannot identify the cause for
the observed carry-over eﬀect between generations. In this subsection, we use
the concept of contraposition to eliminate some possible explanations for the
carry-over eﬀect. The basic idea is simple. We divide the data of young gen-
eration into two subsamples based on their parents’ gender and run regression
(3) separately for the two subsamples. This division serves two important
purposes. First, the division is not related in any way with (i) relaxed budget
constraints, or (ii) a change in gender cost, or (iii) a change in gender wages.
As such, the division should have no impact on the carry-over eﬀect if the
eﬀect was caused by the aforementioned explanations. This means that the
regression results should be the same for both subsamples if the carry-over
eﬀects were caused by an any factor but parents’ gender. Second, if there is a
gender discrimination in a old-generation family, the psychological imprints
on a old-generation boy (the privileged) and a old-generation girl (the de-
prived) should be diﬀerent. Intuitively, for male respondents (the privileged),
since they did not experience the pain of “losing” support, their psycholog-
ical imprint may not be very strong. For the deprived female respondents,
19since they had less education compared with their male siblings, they may be
more likely to preserve the habitus imprint of their families and treat their
children in a similar pattern.
Consider the results in Panel 1 (Age > 24) in Table 5 where Equation
(4) is used in estimation. The estimated generational carry-over eﬀects are
rather diﬀerent for the two subsamples. For children of male respondents, the
carry-over eﬀect is 0:0114, which is statistically insigniﬁcant. On the other
hand, for children of female respondents, the estimated carry-over eﬀect is
0:0441, which is statistically signiﬁcant. By the contraposition, neither the
relaxed budget constraints or a change in gender cost or a change in gender
wages can fully explain the carry-over eﬀect.
4.3 Some sensitivity analysis
To further conﬁrm our results, we consider two alternative subsamples of the
young generation with diﬀerent cutoﬀ ages. Since there is a 2-year mandatory
military service for young men in Taiwan, many males ﬁnished their college
study at the age of 24. In Table 4 and Panel 1 of Table 5, we only include
young generation respondents aged older than 24. To test the sensitivity of
this cutoﬀ age, we also tried other cutoﬀ thresholds, such as 26 and 28.
¿From various columns of Table 5, we see that female children from a
family with gender discrimination do have signiﬁcant habitus eﬀect as they
treat their own children, whereas male children in such families do not show
such a tendency. This suggests that the psychological imprints are indeed
more likely to be on the “deprived” rather than on the “privileged” chil-
dren. This is a very interesting result which may deserve more attention and
discussion from psychologists.
As far as the intergenerational carry-over eﬀect of gender discrimination
is concerned, the change of age-group thresholds does not have much impact
20on the coeﬃcients and their signiﬁcance levels. However, as the age threshold
becomes older, we are moving toward older cohorts, which also makes the
coeﬃcients moving toward the “old generation”. For instance, the coeﬃcient
of fathers’ ethnicity moves to the beneﬁt of mainlanders as the age of children
in question becomes older. This is of course consistent with our previous
discussion.
[Insert Table 5 about here.]
5 Conclusions and Remarks
The purpose of this paper is to test whether there is an intergenerational
transmission of gender preferences in educational resource allocation among
children. The unique data set of Taiwan’s Panel Study of Family Dynamics
project provides us a rich 3-generation education information and allows us
to probe into this question. We performed our analysis along two directions:
the ﬁrst is to see whether the society as a whole has any macro change in
gender-speciﬁc education achievement, and the second is to see whether there
is any within-lineage transmission of gender preferences across generations.
After carefully reviewing the education system and societal characteristics
in Taiwan, we set up an empirical model to estimate and test the hypotheses
of intergenerational transmission of gender preferences and use the concept
of contraposition of a proposition to eliminate various explanations for the
observed intergenerational carry-over eﬀect. As far as the macro pattern is
concerned, we found that although there is a clear tendency of diﬀerential
treatment against females in the old generation, this tendency is signiﬁcantly
weakened and nearly vanishes in the young generation. Moreover, the sup-
porting eﬀect of senior siblings in the old generation becomes a crowding
(resource-dilution) eﬀect in the young generation. However, within each lin-
eage, there is a mild habitus eﬀect in gender-speciﬁc educational resource
21allocation in the sense that parents who had the experience of gender-speciﬁc
diﬀerential treatment tend to treat their children in a similar fashion. This
habitus eﬀect is stronger for female respondents (who were the deprived
group) than for male respondents (who were the privileged group).
As we know, the preferential treatment of child education is more related
to parental attitude, and is also more under the control of parents. One type
of gender-speciﬁc diﬀerential treatment can be observed in the job market,
as the literature has extensively studied. Another line of research worthy of
exploring is to study the education-earnings relationship, and to investigate
whether we can ﬁnd any gender-speciﬁc preferential treatment in the old
and young generations and whether such a preferential treatment has any
pattern of intergenerational transmission. The PSFD data set does not have
suﬃcient information at the current stage; we hope that more earnings data
will be available in the future so that research projects along this line can be
investigated.
22Appendix: A Simpliﬁed Approach of Estimating (2) and (3)
For boys and girls of generation o, equation (2) can be written respectively
as
Yoij = oi + oi + oXoij + Zoi + oij; j 2 boys (A1)
Yoij = oi + oXoij + Zoi + oij; j 2 girls (A2)
Take marginal means of Y ’s, X’s and ’s with respect to j over diﬀerent sexes,
and denote them respectively by (¯ Yoib; ¯ Yoig), ( ¯ Xoib; ¯ Xoig), and (¯ oib;¯ oig), where
b and g refer to boys and girls respectively. Subtract such means from both
sides of (A1) and (A2), we have the following deviation forms:
(Yoij  ¯ Yoib) = o(Xoij  ¯ Xoib) + (oij  ¯ oib); j 2 boys;
(Yoij  ¯ Yoig) = o(Xoij  ¯ Xoig) + (oij  ¯ oig); j 2 girls:
Since  is independent of sexes by assumption, the above two equations can
be pooled together to obtain a consistent estimator for ˆ o. Given ˆ o, the
gender eﬀect of family i in generation o can be obtained algebraically as
follows:
ˆ oi  [(¯ Yoib  ¯ Xoibˆ o)]  (¯ Yoig  ¯ Xoig ˆ o)]:
The same task can be done for generation y, and therefore we can generate
a series ˆ yi.
The above approach can obtain consistent estimators for oi and yi, but
some eﬃciency is lost. In particular, in the process of diﬀerencing equations
(A1) and (A2), the family-speciﬁc variables (Zsi; s = o;y) are sacriﬁced.
Readers are suggested to apply the more eﬃcient approach in the text if
they can obtain the 2002 STATA/SE software.
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26Table 1.    Means and Standard Deviations for Selected Variables 
 
  Both Generations    Old Generation    Young Generation 
    Male Female   Male Female   Male Female 
  1 2    3 4    5 6 
age  40.7 41.5  52.3 52.2  30.2 30.5 
  (13.0) (12.9)    (8.09) (7.77)    (5.82) (5.91) 
Sibling  size  +  1  4.91 5.37  6.39 6.68  3.56 4.01 
  (2.17) (2.17)    (2.06) (2.00)    (1.16) (1.34) 
Birth  order  2.68 2.72  3.20 3.21  2.20 2.22 
  (1.59) (1.56)    (1.79) (1.72)    (1.20) (1.19) 
Number of elder brothers  0.806  0.818    1.09  1.06    0.543  0.567 
  (0.997) (0.968)    (1.16)  (1.09)    (0.725) (0.746) 
Number of elder sisters  0.870  0.903    1.11  1.15    0.654  0.648 
  (1.09) (1.10)    (1.20) (1.19)   (0.923)  (0.922) 
Number of younger brothers  1.12  1.35    1.60  1.75    0.691  0.935 
  (1.23) (1.23)    (1.42) (1.39)   (0.796)  (0.859) 
Number of younger sisters  1.10  1.29    1.58  1.70    0.670  0.866 
  (1.29) (1.40)    (1.51) (1.54)   (0.828)  (1.09) 
Born  after  1956  (%)  59.5 56.9  16.5 16.2  98.6 98.9 
First-born  (%)  29.1 26.7  21.9 19.1  35.6 34.6 
Last-born  (%)  20.0 14.0  13.2 8.90  26.0 19.2 
Years  of  schooling  10.7 9.39  8.81 6.83  12.3 12.0 
  (4.16) (4.69)    (4.39) (4.52)    (3.10) (3.14) 
Father’s  education  5.68 5.51  3.76 3.72  7.43 7.35 
  (4.56) (4.43)    (4.25) (4.12)    (4.11) (3.95) 
Mother’s  education  3.71 3.49  1.83 1.78  5.42 5.25 
  (4.09) (4.04)    (3.32) (3.26)    (3.96) (4.00) 
Father’s  occupation  5.53 5.50  4.28 4.34  6.67 6.69 
  (3.01) (2.93)    (1.83) (1.79)    (3.40) (3.37) 
Father’s  ethnicity  (%)              
    Aborigines  1.97 2.59  1.39 2.48  2.48 2.72 
    Fukien  80.4 78.3  81.8 80.1  79.2 76.4 
Hakka  11.7 12.7  12.2 13.1  11.3 12.2 
    Mainlander  5.92 6.45  4.67 4.32  7.06 8.64 
Number  of  observations  3917 3738  1864 1898  2053 1840 
Number of families  1304  1250    831  823    1168  1054 
Notesj 
1.  The second generation’s children are confined to those who are aged 22 or older in year 2000. 
2.  Father’s occupation is measured on a scale of 0-10, where 10 is professional and technical occupation while 0 is out 
of labor force. For the old generation, this is their father’s longest occupation. For the young generation, this is their 






  24Table 2.    Effects of Sibling and Parental Education on Schooling (Pooling Two Generations Together):   
LS estimation with Huber’s adjustment 
 
Model    1 2 3   
Father’s birth cohort 
       



































     1.99 
(12.1) 
 







Generation* # of elder brothers        -0.153 
(-1.41) 
 







Generation* # of elder sisters        -0.202 
(-2.19) 
 







Generation* # of younger brothers        0.081 
(0.71) 
 







Generation* # of younger sisters        0.058 
(0.68) 
 







Generation* father’s education        -0.116 
(-3.10) 
 







Generation* mother’s education        -0.079 
(-1.85) 
 







Generation* father’s occupation        -0.134 
(-2.29) 
 
Father’s  ethnicity         






















2  0.4732 0.4766 0.4990   
Number of observations    7655  7655  7655   
Number of families    1364  1364  1364   
Note: Asymptotic t-values are in parentheses.
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Table 3.    Effects of Sibling and Parental Education on Schooling: By Generation and Sex 
 
 1  2    3  4 
  Old Generation    Young Generation 
 Male  Female    Male  Female 
Father’s birth cohort 
       




    














































































Father’s ethnicity           

























2 0.3373 0.3860    0.2560 0.2899 
Number of observations  1864  1898    2053  1840 
Note: Asymptotic t-values are in parentheses.
  26Table  4.  Estimates  of  Intergenerational  Transmission Effects of Sex Preference on Schooling 
 
          
  Old Generation    Young Generation 
     Equation  (2)     Equation  (3) 
          
Father’s birth cohort 
        
1920-1929  1.18 
(3.81)  
    















Previous generation’s family specific 









Number of elder sisters  0.289 
(2.96) 
   -0.156 
(-1.88) 
 
Number of younger brothers  -0.299 
(-3.07) 
   -0.307 
(-2.30) 
 
Number of younger sisters  -0.247 
(-2.84) 
   -0.280 
(-3.35) 
 
Father’s education  0.286 
(5.99) 
   0.175 
(6.44) 
 
Mother’s education  0.320 
(6.02) 
   0.233 
(7.83) 
 
Father’s occupation  0.216 
(2.53) 
   0.0288 
(1.03) 
 
Father’s ethnicity           
  Fukien  2.41 
(3.05) 





   2.18 
(4.70) 
 
  Mainlander  3.97 
(4.29) 
   2.53 
(4.57) 
 




      
R
2 0.6095     0.2848   
Number of observations  3762      2049   
Number of families  971      750   
Note: Asymptotic t-values are in parentheses. 
 
  27Table 5.    Estimates of Sex-Preferences Transmission Effects    (using γ
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Hakka 2.21  2.27 


































2 0.2843                  0.3191 0.2666 0.2969 0.3233 0.2862 0.2926 0.3021 0.2954
Number of observations  2049  903  1146  1727  755  972  1406  605  801 
Number of families  750  328  424  638  277  362  536  237  299 
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